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the attempts to clarify both the quality and the extent of liability or radio defamation have shown a lack of uniformity. 24
The growing tendency to view defamation by radio as constituting libel
rather than slander might indicate a result more favorable to the plaintiff, and
to that end the instant case has contributed to a more desirable result. It remains
to be seen whether courts will sweep away established doctrines which are at the
present inadequate to cover the problems of defamation arising under radio
communication.
BERNARD

E. COLE

INSURANCE SALESMEN-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS OR SERVANTS

James A Rainwater was an insurance salesman for defendant. He was to
collect premiums for industrial policies in a prescribed area called a debit, and was
free to sell ordinary life insurance anywhere in the State of Georgia. He had
called on a prospect outside his debit, and was returning to the home office to pick
up papers necessary for his work in the debit, when he negligently struck and
killed plaintiff's husband. A verdict for plaintiff resulted in a judgment of
$7,000.00. Held, affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that
the defendant company exercised such control over Rainwater's employment as to

be liable for his torts. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 43 S.E. (2d) 784 (Ga.
Err. & App. 1947).

The dissent entered by Judge Felton points up a problem of growing importance due to modern insurance methods. The majority had agreed that Rainwater
may have been only an independent contractor while outside his debit, but held
that he had re-entered the role of a servant at the time of the accident. Judge
Felton felt that he had not as yet re-entered; that his going to the office was but
preparation to engage in debit business.
In considering the liability of insurance companies for the torts of their insurance salesmen, the courts have found or denied liability on the basis of the
salesmen being either servants or independent contractors.
Control as to movements, methods, and freedom to discharge have been the
most widely used criteria to establish the master-servant relationship.,
An independent contractor has been defined as one representing another only
as to result of work, and not as to means whereby it is to be accomplished. 2
24. Oreg. Comp. Laws, Ann. sec. 23437 (1940) ; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 2424 (Remington, 1932). (Washington and Oregon have attached penalties to the quality of the
wrong and so have brought it within the field of criminal libel) ; Mont. Rev. Codes,
sec. 5694.1 (Darlington, Supp. 1939). (Montana restricts the liability of the owner or
lessee of the radio station in the absence of actual malice) ; Iowa Code, sec. 659.5
1946) (Iowa uses the due care test to determine the liability of a station owner or
lessee.)
1. See cases collected in 116 A. L. R. 1391.,
2. American Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Riplinger, 249 Ky. 8, 60 S. W. (2d) 115 (1933).

RECENT CASES

In a Wyoming case, Stockwell v. Morris,3 the employee sold washing machines instead of insurance, but the case is quite analagous on principle. The court
stated a preference for the use of the terms, servant and agent rather than servant
and independent contractor, defining a servant as one who performs personal services for another who controls the servant's physical movements, and an agent as
one who represents the employer in contractual negotiations or similar transactions.
The court stated, also, that an employee may act in both relationships, and may act
in both simultaneously, but if the employer is to be liable, the employee must be
acting as a servant in regard to the act which occasioned the injury. Applying this
rule, the court held that the driving of an automobile was only incidental to the
employment, although necessary, and since the employer had no control over this
portion of the work, the employer was not liable for the employee's negligent
operation of the automobile, yet it was this minor factor which was the cause of
the injury. 4

Most courts have held that insurance salesmen are independent contractors ;5
others have held them to be servants ;6 but many have been confronted with the
problem of a dual relationship. 7
When it is found that an employee may be in one relationship for certain
pursuits, and in the other for other aspects of his duties, it is at once apparent that
the question of liability of the employer cannot be answered until it is found in
which relationship the employee stood at the time of his wrongdoing.
The courts have usually held that the employer is responsible only when the
employee is acting as a servant at the very time of the injury and in respect of the
very transaction out of which the injury arose.3
The change of the employee from his role as a servant to that of an independent contractor and back again must be considered in the light of decisions
concerning servants who deviate or depart from their employment to satisfy their
own purposes. It has been held that the deviation must be substantial enough to
amount to an entire departure. 9
The courts have used control as a basis for determining the point and time of
departure or re-entry from or into the role of a servant. 10 The employee has been,
in most cases, considered to have resumed the relationship of a servant where, after
3. 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P. (2d) 189 (1933).
4. The Texas Supreme Court in American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Denke, 128 Tex. 229, 95 S.W.
(2d) 370 (1936) held the opinion written by Justice Blume in Stockwell v. Morris in
great respect. It considers the opinion as the final answer to the problem and quotes
from it at very great length.
5. Vert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 342 No. 629, 117 S.W. (2d) 252 (1938) ; American
Nat. Ins. Co. v. Denke, 128 Tex. 229, 95 S.W. (2d) 370 (1936) ; Wesolowski v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 308 Pa. 117, 162 At 166 (1932).
6. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 43 S.E. (2d) 784 (Ga. Err. & App. 1947) ; Hall v. Sera,
112 Conn. 291, 152 At. 148 (1930).
7. Vert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 342 Mo. 629, 117 S.W. (2d) 252 (1938) ; American
Nat. Ins. Co. v. Denke, 128 Tex. 229, 95 S.W. (2d) 370 (1936).
8. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451, 26 L. Ed. 141 (1880) ; Stockwell v. Morris, 46
Wyo. 1,22 P. (2d) 189 (1933).
9. Loper v. Morrison, 57 Cal. App. 812, 134 P. (2d) 311 (1943).
10. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 43 S.E. (2d) 784 (Ga. Err. & App. 1947) ; Parks v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 69 Ga. App. 720, 26 S.E. (2d) 562 (1943) ; Macon Dairies,
Inc. v. Duhart, 69 Ga. App. 91, 24 S.E. (2d) 732 (1943).

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

the fulfiillment of his duties as an independent contractor, he is returning to resume his duties as a servant.)) It is not necessary for him to have reached the zone
of his employment or debit.
It is generally agreed that it is a question for the jury whether the employee
was a servant or independent contractor at the time of the wrongdoing if there is
sufficient evidence to support either finding.1 2 Where employment appears, the
burden is on the employer to establish an independent contractor relationship.13
Control again is the determinant factor. The right of discharge is a circumstance
of much importance.) 4
In reviewing the cases, it appears that in the majority, the insurance salesmen
have been found to be independent contractors, and even where they occupy the
dual relationship of the principal case, they have been found to be independent
contractors when the accident occurred. This is not a result of a set rule of law
that insurance salesmen are independent contractors per se, but rather, results
from the facts in each case, indicating that the salesman was acting in that
capacity.
ALLYN
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OIL WELL DRILLERS

Plaintiff, an oil well driller, was employed at local wage rates to drill a well
for defendant. Oil had been discovered in the hole but not in commercial quantities.) While so engaged, plaintiff requested that he be paid overtime wages
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.2 The defendant refused the request
and ceased operations, stating that he could not afford to pay wages at the rate
required by the Act. Oil was never produced in commercial quantities. In an
action against the employer to recover overtime for the drilling already performed, an equal amount as liquidated damages, and attorney's fees, plaintiff
sought to show that if any oil had been produced in paying quantities, it normally
would have been shipped to Utah for refining. Held, that because oil was not
produced in commercial quantities, the driller was not engaged in the "production
of goods for commerce" 3 and hence plaintiff was not within the coverage of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. Atwater v. Gaylord (Wyo. 1947) 184 P. (2d) 437.
11. 39 C. J. 1298, See. 1495; Whimster v. Homes, 177 Mo. App. 130, 164 S.W. 236 (1914) ;
Barmore v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 85 Miss. 426, 38 So. 210 (1905) ; Glass v. Wise &
McAlpin, 155 La. 170, 99 So. 409 (1923).
12. Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson, 152 Fed. 681 (C. C. A. 8th 1907).
13. Income Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 168 Tenn. 471, 79 S.W. (2d) 572 (1935).
14. Ibid.
1. Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co., 253 S.W. 908 (Tex. C. A. 1923). The court defined
"commercial quantities" as meaning "That the quantity discovered must be sufficient to
pay the lessee a profit, though small, over operating expenses, although it may never
repay the cost of the well and its operation, and the whole may result in a loss to the
lessee."
2. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S.C. A. sec. 201 (1942).
3. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 201 (1942).

